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The Motives ofHong Kong-Japanese International Joint Ventures 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to study Hong Kong-Japanese joint ventures 
from the perspectives of firm-specific advantages provided by 
both partners. The analysis focuses on the local partner' s 
perspective of establishing international joint ventures (IJV s) 
with a J apanese multinational retailer. First, the background of 
the local pa吋ner， especially the company' s organisational 
restructuring immediately before the formation of the IN s is 
examined. Second, the development and consolidation of the 
IJV s between the two partners by a series of IN activities in 
Hong Kong, Asia, and China is described. Third, the motives 
behind both partners to establish the IJV s are examined. Finally, 
an evaluation of the IJV s of whether the IJV s have fulfilled the 
local partner' s motives is conducted. It is found that the IJV s 
have provided an opportunity for the local partner to overcome 
the increasing J apanese competition in the Hong Kong retail 
sector since the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the local partner 
needs to overcome many management problems resu1ted from 
the IJV s partnership which may have hindered the local pa吋ner
to achieve its objectives in the IJV s. 
Introduction 
After the yen appreciation in 1985, there was a sudden surge of Japanese investment in 
Hong Kong. Among the Japanese investors, Japanese retailers were one of the most 
aggressive investors in the latter half of 1980s. Therefore, locally-owned department stores 
had come under increasing pressure from Japanese competition. ln recent years, as the local 
retail market has become saturated, some of these local stores started to look for a more 
lucrative market in China. However, some local retailers such as Wing On had learnt a tough 
lesson in 1949 when the Communist Chinese Government took over her properties in China, 
which made her hesitant to invest in China again, especially after the Tienanman Square 
lncident in 1989. Under the internal and external pressure, Wing On managed to resolve this 
problem and increased her competitiveness by entering into international joint ventures with a 
Japanese multinational retail giant, the Seiyu Ltd 
Objectives of This Study 
The objectives of this study is to find out why Wing On entered into the IN s with 
Seiyu and how the IJVs impacted on Wing On's performance in the retail business. Almost all 
the existing studies in international joint ventures (IJV s) focus on the study of the foreign 
pa此ners， however, this study focuses on the study of the local partner, Wing On. Under what 
situations were Wing On and Seiyu motivated to team up with each other? After more than 
six years' teaming up with Seiyu, has Wing On managed to achieve what it originally expected 
from the IJV s? Have the IJV s changed Wing On' s corporate strategy and performance? 
These issues are examined in the following 
Methodology 
This research used a case-study approach based primarily on intensive interviews with 
the executives and managers involved in the IJV s supplemented by secondary data - annual 
repo此s， company reports, in-company staff magazine and newspaper clippings of both 
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companies. The author had access to the informants of both companies as a resu1t of her past 
working experience in Seiyu immediately before and during the formation of the IN s. 
Background of Wing On 
In 1907, Wing On Company Ltd. (WOC) was incorporated to operate department 
store and warehouse business. After losing all her properties to the People' s Republic of 
China in 1949, the company changed her business policy in Hong Kong. Wing On abandoned 
to operate her major business in the textile industry and kept the department store business 
which is still considered as an important portion of business. Furthermore, she diversified into 
finance and insurance business which can be liquidated easily and quickly (Chai, 1981 , p.145) 
In order to diversify her business, Wing On set up Wing On (Holdings) Ltd. (WOH) and the 
WOC became a subsidiary of WOH in 1979. WOH became the parent company of the Wing 
On Group . 
Internal Re-organisation of \Ving On 
In February 1989, Wing On re-organised her business by transferring the department 
store busÍness in WOC to a new Ínvestment vehicle incorporated in Bermuda called Wing On 
Department Stores (Bermuda) Ltd. (WODSB) . WODSB was a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
WOC and became the holding company for the Group' s department store operations. The 
Wing On Department Stores Ltd. was renamed as Wing On Department Stores (Hong Kong) 
Ltd. (而rODSHK)， a wholly owned subsidiary of WODSB. This Ínternal re-organisation 
involved the transfer of inventories, furniture, fittings and the department store properties: 
Wing On Plaza and a go-down in Kowloon Bay to WODSHK. According to Russell Kwok 
Chi-yan, director and general manager of WODS , the reason for this re-organisation was "to 
facilitate future expansion of the department store operations in Southeast Asia, North 
America and Australia . . . [since] the Bermuda-based company would be financially 
independent and its performance could be assessed separately so as to facilitate its future 
overseas expansion" (Ko , 1989) 
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In October 1991 , Wing On (Holdings) Ltd. and Wing On Company Ltd. also re-
domiciled to Bermuda and became Wing On Intemational Holdings Ltd. (WOIH) and Wing 
On Company International Ltd. (WOCI). WOIH became the new parent company of the 
Group (see the organisational structure, figure 1). According to Wardley Data (1991) the 
reason for the re-organisation was: 
in view of the increasingly international nature of the group' s assets and the 
significant proportion of the Company's share capital held by overseas shareholders, 
the Directors consider that it would be beneficial to establish a new overseas holding 
company for the Group. This will provide the Group with greater flexibility to 
structure international investments. 
Figure 1: Organisational Structure of Wing On' s Retail-related Business 
Wing On International Holdings Ltd 
[jormer Wing On (Holdings) Ltd before 1991} 
[80D: 7 Kwoks & 3 Seiyu exec lItives] 
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International Joint Ventures Between Wing On and Seiyu 
The reason for Wing On' s internal re-organisation was “unveiled six month later [in 
August 1989] as the manoeuvre was the first step for Seiyu to take a 40% stake in Wing On 
Department Stores . . ." (Anonymous, 1990b, p.95). After the initial step of Wing On teaming 
up with Seiyu, both partners carried out a series of IJV activities in Hong Kong, Asia and 
China to consolidate the IJV s. 
InHong Kong 
According to Root (1987, p .46) joint ventures can be formed by foreign partner' s 
acquisition of a partial ownership interest in the existing local company. The initial entry mode 
of IJV s between Wing On and Seiyu took this form. Both companies signed the joint venture 
contract on September 18, 1989. Wing On Company Ltd sold 40 percent of her wholly-
owned subsidiary, Wing On Department Stores (Bermuda) Ltd. to Seiyu for a cash price of 
HK$356 million. The IJVs between Wing On and Seiyu developed further. In February 1990, 
Wing On Company Ltd. entered into another joint venture with Seiyu to operate a new 
department store in Shatin under the name of Seiyu (Shatin) Department Store. However, 
instead of acquiring interest from Wing On, Seiyu sold 40 percent interest of the Shatin 
operation to WOC by HK$12 million 
These two partners opened a number of new store outlets. In 1990, they replaced the 
previous Mongkok store by a new and larger store, and opened a new store in Tsuen Wan. In 
1991 , they opened two more store outlets in Whampoa Garden and Hunghom, and renovated 
the main store in Sheung Wan. In 1992, they opened their twelfth store outlet in Aberdeen. 
In 1993 , they redeveloped the Yaumatei store ('九Tardley Data, 1993). The redevelopment of 
the Yaumatei store was completed in 1996 
In Asia 
Apart from their co-operation in Hong Kong, Wing On and Seiyu established links in 
Southeast Asia. In 1990, Joel Kwok Chi-ho, the executive director of Wing On Department 
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Stores disclosed that the two companies would entered into further IJV s which was disclosed 
in August 1991. Russell K wok Chi-yan, director and general manager of Wing On 
Department Store, announced that Wing On had teamed up with Seiyu to form an Asian 
Retailer Affiliation Network (AR必J)l with nine retailers in the Asia Pacific region (Lai 1990) 
Russell K wok stated that “ through collective purchase of merchandise, the competitiveness of 
the nine ARAN members is increased through broadening their purchase sources and lowering 
the unit merchandising costs. Furthermore, exchange of views in store design and opening 
new store out1ets jointly may be possible in 臼ture" (Anonymous, 1991 b) . Their first AR創
project was in Singapore's Bugis Junction. Wing On and Seiyu opened a 25 ,000 sq. ft. store 
in the Bugis Junction in mid-1995 (Lee, 1992) 
Three months after the team up of ARAN, Wing On entered another joint venture with 
Seiyu in November 199 1. They formed a joint-venture company called Mujirushi Ryohin 
Bermuda Ltd. under the Ryohin Keikaku Co., Ltd. , a subsidiary of Seiyu (see figure 1). This 
joint-venture company was 80 percent owned by Wing On and 20 percent by Ryohin Keikaku. 
According to Sito (1991) “ this move is in line with Wing 0的 strategy to expand her retail 
business in Asia with Seiyu ." It was reiterated by the Chairman of Wing On, Angela Chan 
(Annual Repo代 1992， p.6) : 
The agreement is to carry on in Asia (other than J apan) a j oint venture business to 
distribute and sell goods and operate stores and out1ets under the brand name: 
Mujirushi Ryohin We consider that Mujirushi Ryohin has considerable potential for 
successful expansion throughout Asia. In November 1992 they opened the first M叮i
store in the Ocean Centre, Hong Kong. It is followed by the second 孔1uji store opened 
in Seibu Department Store, Pacific Place in April 1992. 
In China 
After the IJV s with Seiyu had been consolidated in 1992, Wing On Company 
International decided to return to China after some 40 years. WOCI set up a shelf company, 
1 The nine retailers in ARAN are: Wing On Group (Hong Kong) , Seiyu (Japan) , Family Mart (a subsidiary of 
Seiyu in Japan) , Panvest Group (Taiwan), C P Group (Thailand), Lion Group (Malaysia) , Hero Group, 
Pasaraya Group (Indonesia) and Gem of Hawaii (USA) [Annual Report, 1992b, p.5] 
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Amma to enter into a joint venture with another company, China Development Inc. by taking a 
25 percent stake in the company. Under this joint venture, Wing On invested in China again 
by forming the Wing On Department Store in Wuhan. 
The Motives of the International Joint Ventures 
Wing On and Seiyu were competitors in the retail industry. Why did they team up to 
form the IJV s? In search of a joint venture partner, each company has different rationale to 
enter into IJV s which may dictate the process of finding a partner. Wing On has the following 
motives which have governed her to choose Seiyu as a foreign pa此ner.
的ng On's Motives in the IJVs 
In explaining the rationales for joint ventures, Brown, Rugman and Verbeke (1 988 , 
p.227) stated that "joint ventures are preferred if the two partners possess firm-specific 
advantages (FSAs)2 which complement each other. Only if the FSAs of the partners are 
compatible will that co-operation lead to additional cost-reducing or differentiation-enhancing 
potentia1." Seiyu's FSAs which had attracted and complemented Wing On to enter the INs 
include the following motives. 
Retail technologv and know-how 
When Wing On chose her joint venture partners, she considered Seiyuls established 
position in Japan and know-how in product development and retail technology. Local 
department stores had become less competitive to the J apanese department stores since 
J apanese retailers possessed more advanced marketing, promotion and merchandising 
techniques. The management of Wing On understood that it would take considerably more 
effort and cost to catch up with the level of retail technology achieved by the Japanese. 
According to the announcement to employees through the company' s newsletter, the Voice of 
2 The concept ofFSA refers to a company's proprietary know-how in terms ofunique skills that reduce costs or 
differentiate products. 
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Wing On (1989), one of Wing On's motives to enter into the IJVs with Seiyu was Seiyu's 
strength in retail innovation: 
Up to February 1989, Seiyu has been operating 258 retail outlets in Japan. They 
incl ude department stores, general merchandising stores3, supermarket chain stores 
and convenience stores. Seiyu holds a strong market position in Japan by its streng 
in new product development, and has set the trend of merchandising in Japan. The 
company has developed many brand names and product concepts such as the 
Mujirushi Ryohin (No-name Brand), Shoko-no-sachi (Food Abundance), Sh可u-no-me
(Housewife' s Eye), N -10 Series, Colour Box and Furusato λleihin (Hometown 
Favourites) . . . Therefore, the INs with Seiyu will enhance Wing On's know-how in 
the purchasing and management of merchandises. In addition, it will also help us to 
expand our retail business in Southeast Asia. 
By means of the IJV s, Wing On expected to acquire technical assistance directly from 
Seiyu in the adoption ofretail technology. According to Russell Kwok, this factor was one of 
the most important considerations for the IJV s: 
In the traditional operation practice of department store business, we do not have 
supermarket or fast food section. Thus we lack the know-how to operate these two 
sections. Nevertheless, because of the market demand, the operation of food and 
supermarket sections have become profitable. We are considering to open the food 
section in our department stores in future. It is convenient for us to learn from Seiyu 
since \tve are IJV partners. Furthermore, we can learn the operational techniques in 
supermarket and fast food sections directly from the joint venture operation in Seiyu 
(Shatin) as well (personal communication, 1990). 
3 In Japan , retail stores which sell merchandises of clothing, household and food from lower to medium prices 
are c1assified as general merchandising store. It differentiates from department store which sell the same range 
of merchandise in a upper market. 
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Risk s口read
Another important factor for Wing On to enter the IJV s with Seiyu was for spreading 
risk. Long before Wing On intended to revamp her China business, the Kwok family had been 
approached by the Shanghai Municipal Council, an organ of Chinese government, in mid 
1980s to buy back her former Shanghai department store which was turned into a state-run 
Tenth Department Store (Anonymous 1986, p.3). Instead of buying it back, the Managing 
Director ofWing On Investment (China), David Kwok, only signed an agreement to renovate 
the store (Mayerson, 1985). Wing On hesitated to get involved in China business because “ ln 
1949, we have lost all our properties in China. We do not intend to take the risk to invest in 
China again" (personal communication with Russell Kwok, 1989). Since Wing On had a bad 
experience in China before, she tried to minimise her risks in the investment in Hong Kong and 
China. N evertheless, the China risk factor was great1y decreased by teaming up with Wing 
On. The Personnel Director ofWODS, William WongRussell Kwok stated: 
The joint venture with Seiyu has minimised our risks in losing our operations in Hong 
Kong and China because Wing On Department Stores (Bermuda) Ltd. is no longer a 
locally-owned but a foreign Japanese-owned company. 1 do not think our company 
would be confiscated by the Chinese government again like what happened in 1949 
because we are a foreign-owned company. Therefore, we have less risk to expand our 
operation in Hong Kong after 1997 and expand our business in China (personal 
communication, 1991) 
After minimising the China risk, WODSB started to invest in China by forming a joint 
venture retail business in Wuhan in 1992. In 1993 , it opened the first joint venture children 
specialty store in Wuhan. It was a drastic change in Wing On's corporate strategy since 1949. 
Soeed of entrv in Southeast Asian market 
Another FSA of Seiyu was that the IJV s helped to speed up Wing On' s entry in the 
Southeast Asian markets . Wing On planned to invest in the international markets of the 
United States, Australia and Southeast Asia. The expansion plan in Asian markets coincided 
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with that of Seiyu because of the economic boom in the Asian countries. The Bugis project in 
Singapore was their first IJV s project in Asia. Since Seiyu had already had a majority of 
interest in the Bugis project, Wing On could access the market of Singapore easily by opening 
a department store jointly with Seiyu in 1995. According to M明ke， the Chairman of Seiyu 
(Shatin),“we have fi叫ler planned to expand our stores in other Southeast Asian countries 
such as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and so on (personal communication, 1990) 
Economies of scale 
Wing On regarded that Seiyu could provide wider but cheaper sources of merchandises 
in good quality and design since “Seiyu has taken the product development as one of its major 
areas of operation in international business" (Annual Report, 1992b). Wing On could benefit 
from obtaining favourable purchase through economies of scale from the regional 
organisation, ARAN. The Executive Director of Corporate Planning and Controller, Joel 
K wok, pointed out,“after WODS and Seiyu have succeeded in their planned expansion in 
Southeast Asia, we expect WODS would have a more than 15 percent growth in sales 
turnover in 1990 as a resu1t of the economies of scale from a bigger operation" (Lee, 1990) 
Seiyu 's Motivates in the l刀3
On the other hand , the FSAs of Wing On that had attracted Seiyu to enter into the 
IJV s are as follows. 
Access to prime locations and markets 
Seiyu intended to expand its overseas store as one of its long-term international 
business strategy. According to the Chairman of the Seiyu Ltd., Seiji Tsutsumi,“Seiyu 
considers Hong Kong as the centre of its investments in Asia outside Japan" (Cabatit, 1989) 
Nevertheless, almost all major Japanese retailers had already invested in Hong Kong by the 
latter half of 1980s. Seiyu was a late-comer and it became di在icult to set up stores in Hong 
Kong as most of the prime locations had either been taken up by other Japanese and local 
competitors or too expensive to lease and purchase in the overheated property market in Hong 
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Kong. Seiyu found that the access to these locations and markets could rely on the joint 
venture with Wing On which had owned many prime retail locations in various part of Hong 
Kong. 
Speed of entrv 
Another FSA was the availability of Wing On' s long established business 
infrastructure. Seiyu managed to move into Hong Kong market quickly because it could make 
use of many facilities already available in WODS. For example, as pointed out by Managing 
Director of Seiyu (Shatin), Miyake: 
We have little need to invest in peripheral business related to department store 
operation in Hong Kong. We can make use of the services of insurance, banking, 
security and prope此y provided by our joint venture partner, WOH' s subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, we can make use of the services of warehousing, transport and computer 
and information system provided by WODSHK. In other words, we have only 
invested HK$18 million but can obtain all other related services (personal 
communication, 1990) 
Evaluation of the International J oint Ventures 
Both pa此ners have expanded locally and internationally since the formation of IJV s. It 
appears that both partners have benefited from the joint ventures. Nevertheless, strategic 
success of the IJV s depends on a mix of factors. The performance of the IJV s are evaluated 
from Wing On's perspectives ofwhether her motives in teaming up with Seiyu were achieved . 
Status 0/ Wing On 
According to Allen (1990), the immediate effect of the IJVs was an increase in Wing 
On' s net profit and thus an increase of rewards to its shareholders: 
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Wing On Co. yesterday posted an impressive 4 1.5 percent jump in profit from 
HK$139.9 million to HK$192.2 million for the year to December 1989. The Kwok 
family . . . celebrated its success by rewarding shareholders with a generous total 
dividend of 40 cents a share, almost double its 1988 pay-out of 22 cents . . . The 
balance sheet was boosted by an extraordinary gain of HK$170.1 million, compared 
with only HK$12. 3 million the year before. It resu1ted from the sale of a 40 percent 
stake in its subsidiary, Wing On Department Stores, to the Japanese retail giant Seiyu. 
Furthermore, the IJV s had greatly improved the financial hea1th of Wing On since she 
had not only fully paid her debts but also had an account surplus that was the first time in 
many years (D缸， 1990). Some financial analysts even stated that Wing On' s link with Seiyu 
was considered as an aid to Wing On' s declining department store business. Wing On 
managed to maintain her interim result satisfactory in face of the strong J apanese competition 
in the early 1990s (Ko, 1990). After the first year's good results, Wing On's net profit and her 
rewards to shareholders continued to increase: 
Wing On repo口ed a 38 percent jump in net profit yesterday for the year ended last 
December. . . It recorded net profit of$260.88 million with $189 .43 million in 1989 . . 
Turnover rose by 21 percent to $1.9 billion . . . Directors declared a final dividend of 
30 cents a share, making a total pay-out of 45 cents (Anonymous, 1991 a) 
Compared with the other local department stores which were just surviving in the 
J apanese competition, Wing On managed to open many new store outlets under the IJV s. 
Thus, Wing On was considered as the most outstanding local department stores among the 
retailers in Hong Kong. The increase of profit, improved financial health and aggressive 
expansion had enhanced Wing On' s status among the local retailers as Kirby (1991) stated, 
"Wing On is one of the last indigenous department store groups in the territory'\ 
Advancement in Retαil Technology 
Wing On obtained considerable assistance from Seiyu in upgrading her retail operation. 
According to a Japanese expatriate manager of Seiyu (Shatin), Ms Tanaka, when Wing On 
renovated the main store in 1992, a design team coming from Seiyu Japan assisted Wing On to 
12 
renovate the main store by a J apanese-style store layout approach (personal communication, 
1992). Furthermore, Russell Kwok pointed out,“as a result of the INs with Seiyu, we can 
learn the retail information technology from Seiyu. For example, we have jointly purchased 
some modern cash register machines which can increase our company' s efficiency" 
(Anonymous, 1990a). Basical1y, Wing On has implemented electronic point-of-sales 
technology which has improved the overal1 operational efficiency. 
Changes in Wing On 法 Corporate Strategies as a Result of Risk Spread and Economies of 
Scale 
After teaming up with Seiyu, Wing On had changed some of her corporate strategies. 
First, Wing On' s investment in China signified a drastic change in her corporate strategy in 
China' s market. The IJV s with Seiyu had greatly reduced the China risk in the PRC markets 
which had been avoided for some forty years by the Kwok family. According to Mark Kwok, 
corporate manager of Wing On Department Stores, the investment in the Wuhan store was not 
smal1 since “ the venture's paid-up capital is just US$50,OOO but some US$ 1.2 rni l1ion has 
earmarked for renovation and equipment cost" (Ward, 1992). Angela Chan, the Chairman of 
WOIH, stated,“Wing On did not expect significant profit contribution from the PRC activities 
in the short term. However, the company' s expansion of department store business into the 
PRC formed a key part of Wing On' s development strategy and its long term prospects were 
encouraging" (Annual Report, 1993) 
Second, Wing On has re-organised internal1y and set up a complicated network of 
cross-shareholding among different subsidiaries of both pa此ners with which they have 
commercial dealings. The cross-shareholdings of the pa口ner companles suppo此 a subtle blend 
of financial independence and commercial cooperation. Furthermore, it leads to less risk, 
sharing resources with the joint venture partner and lower tax. The joint ventures have an 
immediate effect of turning Wing On into a profitable company. Shareholders become more 
optimistic of Wing On' s business as a resu1t of the team up of and the backup from Seiyu. 
Wing On has become more international in terms of store and merchandise operation. She has 
shown to the Hong Kong public that she wi l1 not transfer more capital out of Hong Kong but 
wi l1 invest more in China as a resu1t ofthe joint ventures. 
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Furthermore, Wing On has changed its purchase and merchandising policies. Retail 
specialists pointed out,“After joint venture with Seiyu, Wing On seems to have become more 
open in her business practices. In the past, Wing On mainly purchased European and 
American merchandises that are more expensive. Now, Wing On purchase mainly from the 
Southeast Asian countries" (Anonymous, 1990b) 
Control 0/ Joint Ventures 
As a resu1t of the IJVs, three Japanese executives joined the Board of Directors of 
Wing On International Holdings Ltd . The rest of the seven members were the Kwok family 
('九Tardley Data, 1993). Although holding a minority interest in the joint ventures, Seiyu could 
gain certain extent of control over the joint ventures. As Root (1987 , p.153) pointed out: 
Minority pa此ner can also exercise control through bylaws that grant it certain rights, 
e.g. , the selection ofkey executives, management contract, issuance ofvoting and non-
voting stock shares . . . the minority interest may also be protected by holding veto 
rights over key decisions in the joint venture, such as dividend declaration or new 
capital investment. 
Both pa討ners had certain control in the decisions of each other - Seiyu over WODS 
and Wing On over Sei卯 (Shatin) which might help safeguard both pa巾ers' interest to a 
certain extent. Both partners co-operated very well at the beginning. Karl K wok stated,“We 
believe the successful partnership of Wing On Department Stores group with Seiyu will assist 
a profitable growth of our department store business in both Hong Kong and internationa11y" 
(Annual Report 1990, p.9) 
Perforn1ance of the Joint Ventures and the Responses of的ngOn'sManαgement
After two years of increased net profit as a resu1t of the joint venture, Wing On turned 
into a loss from 199 1. According to Horne (1992), Wing On's link-up with Seiyu “ took its 
to11 on the Hong Kong company' s profitability last year [1991] . Its latest profit figures include 
a loss of $15 .6 mi11ion being its share of losses of associated companies, most of which is 
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believed to be linked with Seiyu". Another analyst, Dai (1993) commented that Wing On's 
investment in joint venture projects in Seiyu (Shatin) Department Stores and the Mujirushi 
Ryohin has not only led to lower profitability but also incurred losses. According to Karl 
Kwok, the high operating-cost environment had affected the business ofWing On Department 
Stores. Angela Chan, the chairman of the Board of Directors WOIH, reiterated that operating 
profit decreased owing to the high operating cost environment in Hong Kong. She 
commented that Mujirushi Ryohin chains of shops, in its development phase,“had no 
significant impact on Group resu1ts. The Seiyu (Shatin) Department Store . . . continues to 
suffer from the same pressure which affect our department store business in Hong Kong" 
(Annual Report 1992a, p.6). Nevertheless, the IJVs of Seiyu (Shatin) Department Stores and 
Mujirushi Ryohin have gradually picked up their business during these four years which put 
less pressure on the Group resu1ts. The major pressure on the Group resu1t is the economic 
downturn of Hong Kong since the mid-1995 which is affecting Wing On' s performance and 
profitability (personal communication, 1996) 
Potential Problems 
It appears that the joint ventures have run into some problems. Some scholars 
commented that international joint venture are bounded to have many problems owing to the 
cross-cultural differences (Brown, Rugman and Verbeke, 1988; Young, Hamil, Wheeler and 
Davies, 1989). Furthermore, Pucik (1992, p.245) argued,“In a competitive collaboration, the 
strategic intent of achieving dominance makes the long term winJwin outcome highly unlikely 
in the partnership". In addition, a m句or factor here is to understand the competition. When 
these two companies invest in the two projects in Seiyu (Shatin) Department Store and Muji 
Stores, they have better to access their local competitive positions, obtain a consensus in 
company commitment, maintain competitive initiative, focus resources on their competitive 
advantage, monitor strategies and change the strategies as the business evolves 
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Conclusion 
The collaboration between Wing On and Seiyu may appear to be a double-edged 
sword, capable of both aiding and injuring Wing On. The injuring effect occurs when Wing On 
incurred a loss in the last four years of the joint venture with Seiyu. However, a success臼1 joint 
venture requires a continuous and ongoing effort and negotiation by both partners. As Geringer 
(1 988, p.187) pointed out,“unanticipated changes in the internal and external environment will 
occur . . . strict reliance on the initially negotiated contract may produce less than satisfactory 
performance . . . unless modifications are implemented." This may help solve the problem of the 
pa口ner who feels victimised by disparate outcomes. Since a balanced perception of both partner 
in the joint venture is essential to the maintenance of trust and harmonious relationship. 1n other 
words, continuous efforts are required from both Wing On and Seiyu in order to maintain a 
viable international joint venture. 
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